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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

INFO MEMO

January 28, 2004

FOR: Ambassador Bremer
FROM: David Gompert, Senior Advisor for National Security & Defense
SUBJECT: Badr Corps Militia Strategy

Background

The Badr Corps, military wing of SCIRI, is believed to be 10-12,000 strong, although only 3,000 are professionally trained. Many Badr Corps members are Iraqi army defectors and POWs from the Iran-Iraq war. [REDACTED] 1.4b, 1.4d

[REDACTED] 1.4b, 1.4d

After the elder Hakim's assassination, the Badr Corps established a heavy security presence in Najaf. SCIRI hopes its fighters will be eventually absorbed into the Iraqi army and police, but has complained that Badr candidates are being rejected unfairly. In informal discussions, Badr Corps leaders have called for unit transfers into the IAF. Given [REDACTED] 1.4b, 1.4d and possible fringe elements in the Badr Corps, individual and small-unit transfers would have to be finely screened.

There are three reasons why it is timely to tackle the problem of the Badr Corps: (1) the progress are we making on the Pesh, which will strengthen our hand (since the Badr Corps cannot hide behind our tolerance of the Pesh); (2) the approaching prospect of an effective ban on militia in the TAL; and (3) our belief that the growing problem of more extreme Islamist armed groups can be dealt with better if isolated. Failure to deal with Badr Corps weakens our ability to manage the risks of Shi'a extremism, [REDACTED] 1.4b, 1.4d inroads and Shi'a-Sunni conflict.

Strategy

The strategy for dealing with Badr Corps differs from that we're using with the Kurds in three ways: (1) we can and should reveal more "stick" with Badr; (2) we should be less flexible about transfers into Iraqi security services; and (3) we should shift to SCIRI the onus of transferring or reintegrating 100% of the Badr Corps. On the last point, extremist or [REDACTED] 1.4b, 1.4d remnants that resist reintegration or are unfit for transfer can be dealt with through military pressure.

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Despite these differences, our goal should be to settle with the Badr Corps in the next month, giving them a chance to comply with the expected TAL provision banning militia, while also reducing the danger that they will try to spoil our settlement with the Kurds.

There is a need to engage SCIRI/Badr on the militia issue through an initial meeting with Abd Al Aziz Al Hakim to appeal for an understanding that the Badr Corps cannot exist outside the law. That could be handled by you or me. Our position should be that we would like to work together with SCIRI to find appropriate solutions for former Badr Corps personnel. Specifically, their people will have of three options from which to choose:

1. *Retirement*: Just how many personnel are of retirement age will need to be determined in subsequent WG meetings with Badr leadership
2. *Reintegration* into the civilian sector through retraining and job programs: Although Badr leadership will likely be resistant, wishing the bulk forces to transfer into the state security services, it is probable that, depending upon PMO/CIC donor funding, retraining programs may be more attractive to many individual Badr militiamen. Infrastructure projects and private investment should create a stronger demand for labor and increase the numbers of this option.
3. *Transfer* into the security services, as follows:
 - IAF/IAFR: CJTF-4C2 will need to weed out Badr Corps personnel who have been [redacted] 1.4b, 1.4d
 - Police: Some numbers of Badr are currently conducting policing work. This should be formalized under MoI. (MoI will have records regarding the numbers currently thus employed and the capacity of IPS to absorb additional recruits.)

It is not clear at this point how many personnel might appropriately be reintegrated through each of these options. As with the Kurds, one of the first orders of business will be to get accurate numbers and realistic estimates, by option, on the table.

Badr Corps personnel must *not* be offered the opportunity to join the Border Police at this time, given their [redacted] 1.4b, 1.4d links. We should not rule out modest small-unit transfers into the ICDC (IAFR), as the Kurds will be permitted. But this should be a fall-back, end-game move. We would prefer that the combination of the three avenues noted above would suffice, especially if Badr Corps leaders and militiamen understand the implications not selecting one of our options.

In this connection, well-timed and publicized military pressure on smaller, violence-prone extremist militias would have a salutary demonstration effect. It would show Badr Corps leaders that failing to agree to dismantlement could have severe consequences, encourage 100% of their people to accept one of the paths we offer, and take away SCIRI's argument that eliminating Badr Corps would leave the field to the extremists.

I have scheduled a meeting with you and General Sanchez to discuss aspects of this strategy.

COORDINATION: Governance

CC: LTG Sanchez, [redacted] (b)(6)

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Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201506

February 3, 2004

XO-Plz File
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TO: Jerry Bremer
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Iraqi Police Training

You told me I was being misinformed by my staff. I checked. I keep getting the same story. Maybe you ought to check with your staff and see if you have correct and current information.

For example, I am again being told that "most of the police training outside of Baghdad is being done by the military with CERP funds."

I am still being told that "much of the training in Baghdad is by the military people who have been certified by the civilian trainers."

There are a variety of sources of funds for security. I am told they include CERP funds, Supplemental funds, DFI funds, donated equipment from countries like Japan, and OFF funds. My concern is that unless we have some control over the budget, the security task won't get done, in which case our troops will have to remain there, as they have in Bosnia and Kosovo.

My suggestion is that we have CENTCOM as the executive agent. The civilians can set the training standards, and the police can report to the Ministry of Interior after they are trained and equipped and deployed. We would still need unity of command in some way, so that we don't get the blue-on-blue problems we talked about on the phone.

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My recommendation is that you sit down with your CPA police advisors. Get whoever has any voice on police in a room, and see if we can get to ground truth.

(b)(6) produced the attached paper as a possible solution off of our phone conversation today. It would be helpful and possibly save us two or three iterations if you think through what I said and the attached paper, and then meet with your folks to see if in fact we can get closer to the same set of facts.

Thanks.

Attach.

2/3/04 Policy/J-5 paper: Iraqi Police: Reconciling Eikenberry Assessment and Bremer Comments

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Please respond by _____

Approved for Release

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IRAQ SECURITY FORCES ASSESSMENT TEAM INITIAL FINDINGS

Final Draft Thu 29 Jan 2004

BACKGROUND

Under the direction of Commander USCENTCOM, an Iraqi Security Forces Assessment Team (ISFAT) was established on 5 January 2004 to conduct a comprehensive review of the strategy and plans for building Iraqi Security Forces. The Team comprised 22 members representing the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) - Washington, the Department of State, the Joint Staff, USCENTCOM, and the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence [Annex A].

ISFAT Terms of Reference (TOR) included 11 specified tasks [Annex B]. In implementing the TOR, the Team focused on: 1) The role, missions and requirements of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF); 2) Resource strategies and business practices; and 3) command & control arrangements necessary to achieve United States Government and Coalition partner objectives.

The Team conducted its mission from 5-30 January 2004, meeting with numerous U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi civilian & military personnel in Washington D.C., USCENTCOM HQ, USCENTCOM HQ- Forward (Qatar), and throughout Iraq [Annex C]. The Team's Initial Findings [draft] are provided below.

PROGRESS TO DATE

In the months following the end of major conflict, CPA, USCENTCOM, and CJTF-14 have made great progress under extraordinary circumstances. In particular there have been significant improvements in the areas of governance and in the restoration of essential services. Local city councils are up and running, the Iraqi Governing Council has been in place since June 2003, and all 23 ministries have designated Interim Ministers who are beginning to exert their authority. Major hospitals and clinics have been restored; schools and universities are once again functioning; civil servants are back at work and being paid according to a national pay scale; and electric power supply is back to pre-war levels. Such achievements have been made possible by successful Coalition efforts to restore security and stability to many parts of the country.

On 1 July 2004 the Iraqi people regain their sovereignty and commence a process that will lead to a representative government. Many challenges are associated with this period of major change and uncertainty; continued progress is not yet inevitable. In anticipation of this summer's transition of authorities, there is both a need and an opportunity to put into place a Coalition-Iraqi security concept and structure that will permit satisfactory conclusion of the ongoing campaign to establish a stable non-threatening Iraq.

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CRITICAL WORKING ASSUMPTIONS

The Team made the following critical working assumptions based upon their briefings and observations:

- The major near to mid-term¹ threats to Coalition success are:
 - Effective operations by hostile elements that undermine Iraqi society's confidence in, and support for, peaceful transition to full national sovereignty.
 - The emergence of sustained conflict between major Iraqi ethnic or religious groups.
- There is no significant external threat to Iraq through the mid-term due to Coalition presence and commitment.
- Iraqi security related ministries (Defense, Interior, Justice, and Critical Infrastructure), will *not* be effective through the mid-term.
- Iraqis will continue to support and implement Coalition concepts and plans with respect to Iraqi Security Forces beyond the 1 July 2004 transition date.
- Coalition forces will retain command & control of the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) and Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), and effective operational & training assistance links to the Iraqi Police Services (IPS) & critical infrastructure security forces beyond 1 July 2004.

KEY OBSERVATIONS

The Team made the following key observations, based on the factual evidence of their briefings and visits in Iraq:

- **Threat**
 - Threats and security requirements differ significantly throughout the cities, provinces, and regions of Iraq.
 - Evolving internal security threats can only be effectively dealt with by capable & credible Iraqi Security Forces and through initiatives to improve infrastructure & employment.

¹ Near-term is defined as now through to September 2004. Mid-term is defined as October 2004 through to the end of 2005.

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▪ **Command and Control**

- There is a misalignment of missions, C2, responsibilities, and resource authorities between CPA, USCENTCOM and CJTF-4 regarding the Iraqi Security Forces training, equipping, fielding, and operational employment (Annex D).
- CPA capacity to establish policy and build the Iraqi security sector is limited by personnel shortages, experience levels, and high staff turnover rates.
- CPA lacks adequate presence outside Baghdad to contribute effectively to the development of regional security; CJTF-4 and MSCs² maintain the only continuous and robust presence in the regions.

▪ **Iraqi Security Forces**

- Roles, missions and standards of various Iraqi Security Forces, especially the ICDC and the New Iraqi Army, are not clearly defined.
- Iraqi Police are pivotal forces in the campaign to improve security in Iraq, but are being developing slowly and unevenly.
- All MSCs view ICDC units as playing a critical role in ongoing efforts to improve security within their sectors.
- The transition of Iraqi Facility Protection Service forces from CJTF-4 to Iraqi ministry control is behind schedule.
- Critical infrastructure ministries (e.g. oil, transportation and electricity) are in the process of developing their own security forces with CPA assistance.
- Key to fielding capable and credible Iraqi Security Forces is effective mentoring subsequent to the basic training courses.
- Embedding Coalition soldiers has proved to be the only effective means of rapidly training, equipping, and mentoring Iraqi Security Forces. With the exception (for the most part) of the New Iraqi Army, all other Iraqi Security Forces have been trained and sustained by Coalition forces.
- MSC results with respect to building security forces have generally been excellent, but there are exceptions.

² Major Subordinate Commands of CJTF-4 are division or brigade commands, each assigned a geographic sector within Iraq. There are currently six MSCs.

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- Most key security related ministries and organizations (e.g. Defense, Interior, Joint Force Headquarters and Justice) are developing slowly and have little or no capacity to establish policy for, or manage, nationwide programs.
- Ongoing governance transition, coupled with the absence of a defined national security system, precludes Iraqi development of a coherent national security and military strategy in the near-term.

▪ **Security Sector Resources**

- The process to let contracts with appropriated funds is not responsive.
- Requirements and budget estimates for Iraqi Security Forces are uneven; ICDC and IAF estimates are reasonably sound, but those for the Iraqi Police Services are not.
- The CJTF-4 MSCs have provided the vast majority of resources for the building of regional Iraqi Security Forces via Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP).
- There are significant equipment shortages, most urgently weapons, vehicles and communications, in the Iraqi Police Services and ICDC.

▪ **Militia**

- Assimilation of at least some of the armed militias into the Iraqi Security Forces – especially ICDC – while feasible programmatically, has attendant risks and is ultimately a political issue.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

By setting their observations in the context of the working assumptions, the Team deduced the following guiding principles:

- Credible and capable Iraqi Security Forces must be fielded and sustained as rapidly as possible; this can only be achieved by simultaneously building security forces from bottom up while creating the relevant ministries from the top down.
- Unity of Effort in establishing and employing Iraqi Security Forces can only be achieved through Unity of Command.
- Responsibility for missions and tasks must be aligned with the appropriate resource authority.

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- Decentralized execution at the MSC-level is necessary to ensure sufficient flexibility & freedom of action in executing the campaign plan.
- Rapid growth of effective Iraqi Security Forces will require a sustained commitment to mentoring and monitoring, underpinned by an objective certification process.
- Future Iraqi Security Forces manpower and sustainment costs must be affordable.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Team makes the following initial recommendations:

Strategic Concept The Team endorses the strategic concept being developed by CENTCOM to transition security responsibilities to Iraqi forces thereby allowing a reduction in the Coalition forces needed to perform internal security tasks. This concept envisages the transition ("hand-off") to Iraqi responsibility of local (tactical) control, followed by regional/provincial (operational) control, culminating with national (strategic) control supported by necessary Coalition assistance. Within this context and building on the excellent model put forward by Multinational Division Southeast [Annex E], the Team recommends the Coalition main effort focus on building Iraqi capacity to assume internal security responsibilities. Our immediate goal should be to create Iraqi Security Forces trusted by their people, and capable of establishing the conditions for accelerated economic reconstruction and improved governance. Our end state should be for Iraqi Security Forces under the control of a representative Iraqi government to maintain a stable and secure environment. A practical plan to achieve this end state follows:

- Local (Tactical) hand-off of responsibilities. Coalition forces will train and mentor Iraqi Security Forces leading to their certification to perform internal security tasks, independent of other coalition forces, in local populated areas. Coalition forces will create leadership cadres (Iraqi officers and NCOs) and embed other Coalition trainers and mentors in all Iraqi Security Force tactical units. The Coalition will provide direction and exercise varying degrees of operational control over Iraqi forces³ during this phase. The goal of this phase will be the certification of specified forces (eg, police stations, ICDC company-level units, Border Police frontier posts, etc.) by 1 July 2004.
- Regional/Provincial (Operational) hand-off of responsibilities. During this phase Iraqi forces, assisted by embedded trainers and mentors, will achieve regional operational capability. They will be able to conduct province-wide operations up

³ Specific arrangements are to be codified in the Security Agreement; New Iraq Army and ICDC must be under Coalition command and control, whereas a relationship permitting close operational coordination with and training assistance to the Iraqi Police Services will be necessary.

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to the battalion level of command. Coalition forces will increasingly take on a strictly advisory role for internal security, leaving operations to the Iraqis themselves. The goal of this phase will be the certification of higher echelons of Iraqi internal security forces' commands (eg, police districts, ICDC battalion level units, Border Police sectors, etc.) to conduct operations independent of other Coalition forces by 1 September 2004. Goal achievement will result in a commensurate reduction in the number of Coalition forces required to perform internal security tasks.

- National (Strategic) hand-off of responsibilities. During this phase, the Iraqi forces will achieve the capability to deter threats to Iraqi sovereignty and territory with only a minimal Coalition presence that provides training assistance and serves as a deterrent force. These goals should be achieved by 1 July 2006, assuming sufficient progress in the fielding of the Iraqi Armed Forces.

Rapid and effective Iraqi security institution building (ie, Defense, Interior, National Security Council, Justice, etc.) must proceed apace with the sequential local, regional/provincial and national hand-offs to ensure the necessary Iraqi Government capacity exists to assume increasing responsibilities.

Mission Focus The Coalition's aim is to enable the Government of Iraq to provide, manage and maintain its own security as rapidly as possible. This is consistent with the political intent to return sovereignty to the Iraqi people on 1 July 2004. However, until the Iraqi state has established capable and credible security forces, the responsibility for maintaining a safe and secure environment remains with the Coalition. It follows that Coalition main effort should now focus on standing up Iraqi security forces and transitioning internal security responsibilities to them. This should include as a specified task the immediate protection of Iraqi critical infrastructure (oil, electricity, transportation, etc.), and the training of Iraqi security forces to assume responsibility for protection over time. The goal should be for Iraqi Security Forces to replace, rather than assist, Coalition forces. This implies the development of command & control (C2) and accountability mechanisms, adequate resources, and objective certification. This priority should be reflected in Coalition forces' mission statements and commanders' intent.

Unity of Command The rapid and coherent development of Iraqi security forces requires unity of effort across the security sector. Given the facts identified in the Key Observations section above, the Team unanimously recommends assigning the Coalition Commander the mission of training, equipping, fielding, and certifying all Iraqi Security Forces (police, ICDC, New Iraqi Army, Border Police, and Critical Infrastructure Protection forces). At the same time he must retain command & control of ICDC & New Iraqi Army forces and be permitted to maintain tight operational links with the Iraqi Police Services and Critical Infrastructure Protection forces. The Coalition Commander should also have the lead in assisting the Iraqi authorities establish their Ministries of Defense and Interior. Expert civilian administrators should head the Ministry of Interior, police, and perhaps Ministry of Defense programs, but their organizations must be placed

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within the Coalition Force Command (wherein the necessary planning, training, and communications capabilities reside) so as to achieve unity of effort. Alternative arrangements, to date, have not proven effective and time is not on our side.

Consolidation of responsibilities for building Iraqi Security Forces under the Coalition Command would also posture us well for the post-30 June 2004 CPA dissolution. To split authorities between a Coalition Force HQs and a US Embassy could create seams. The Coalition Command, so constituted, should be presented to the Iraqi people as an organization committed to the rapid building of Iraqi Security Forces & institutions necessary to their effective administration of national sovereignty. A strategic communications campaign to this effect will be required. After the return of sovereignty, the Coalition Commander should provide advice to the Iraqi national security community collective leadership. His command should also maintain vertical and horizontal operational and training linkages with Iraqi governing bodies and relevant security forces through provincial and local Joint Coordination organizations. [Annex F]. We should not wait until 1 July to make this shift, but should put this structure in place immediately.

Iraqi Security Forces Iraqi Security Forces must be fielded in a manner that balances immediate against long-term security requirements. The ongoing battle to defeat organized armed elements in Iraq demands capable and credible indigenous police and ICDC. On the other hand, the New Iraqi Army represents a potentially powerful symbol of national unity and can serve as a stabilizing force within a politically immature state; accordingly, its development is postponed only at some risk to Iraq's future security. Additionally, it is essential that the institutions that will set policy and oversee various Iraqi Security Forces be developed expeditiously, especially with the rapidly approaching transition to Iraqi sovereignty. This is especially important regarding the Ministry of Defense, which will be responsible for the ICDC. In the absence of an effective control mechanism (currently Coalition forces), the ICDC represents a potentially dangerous militia force. Broad recommendations for the fielding of Iraqi Security Forces include:

- Establish clear roles, missions, and capabilities for all forces – at present there are variations between the MSCs. Standardize and emphasize uniforms, equipment, and training standards within each force to enhance esprit and promote national identity within units and among the people.
- Task MSCs to recommend Iraqi Security Forces' requirements within their sectors based upon threat and strategies, vs. determination by formulistic ratios; conduct "illustrative planning scenario" exercises to test and validate recommended force structures.
- Ensure a single "force provider" for each of the major security forces exists within the Coalition Command structure - Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) for ICDC & the New Iraqi Army and a similar organization for the Iraqi Police Services & possibly the Critical Infrastructure Protection forces.

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- Direct the Coalition Command and MSCs to establish robust integrated staff elements responsible for the training, equipping, fielding and certification of all Iraqi Security Forces within assigned sectors. [Note: To this end, the 101st Air Assault Division's use of its Air Defense Artillery Battalion and the Multinational Division – Southeast (MND SE) establishment of a "Security Sector Reform" staff section impressed many Team members.]
- Require MSCs to include Iraqi Security Forces in their friendly orders of battle and task organizations so as to raise commanders' awareness of the main Coalition effort.
- Direct Coalition commanders to employ aggressively Information Operations to increase the prestige and credibility of Iraqi Security Forces among the Iraqi people.
- Maintain Coalition flexibility to ensure common standards are maintained in standing up Iraqi forces; Coalition partners which do not have experience in training and mentoring other forces may require assistance.

The Team makes the following recommendations for each of the major security forces:

- **Iraqi Police Services (Police and Border Police)** We recommend significantly accelerating police training and equipping programs. A greater number of police than the current end-strength target will be required. The current requirement is for 1 police officer per 300 people; we believe that the ratio should be lower, ie, more police, especially within urban areas – an assessment shared by CPA police advisors and MSC commanders. It would be prudent to program now for the fielding of 100,000 trained police – up from the current target of 85,000. The immediate challenge, however, is to meet current objectives. Since civilian efforts to train and mentor police are unlikely to produce the intended results in a timely manner, the military should be assigned the task and resource authority for training, equipping, mentoring and certifying the Police and Border Police. Civilian police experts should be assigned to all MSCs to direct the programs within sectors. One noteworthy example of this concept in action is the UK 20th Armored Brigade's establishment, under civilian police oversight, of a mixed infantry and military police battle group in Basra exclusively focused on police training and certification.

Complementing the buildup in police is the need to rebuild other components of the justice system (prisons and judicial capacity) to sustain the increase in throughput – a task belonging to agencies other than the Department of Defense. If the growth in judicial capacity does not keep pace with that of law enforcement, campaign plan success will be delayed. Current plans are incomplete and inadequate.

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- **Iraqi Civil Defense Corps.** We recommend that the ICDC be retained and renamed the Iraqi Civil Guard, a more prestigious and better descriptive title. It is the view of the team that there will be an enduring need for a 'gendarmierie' type force. The force might be a national guard type organization, assigned to the Ministry of Defense, but under the command and control of provincial civil authorities when committed to internal security tasks. Its mission should be oriented toward providing local security in situations beyond the response capabilities of the local police. The force should be capable of fighting in small tactical engagements and be certified to take responsibility for security duties in localities now protected by Coalition forces. Current plans to expand the ICDC from the current 36 to up to 43 battalions meet aggregate MSC projected requirements and should be resourced. At the same time, there should be a concerted effort to consolidate and improve the quality of the current inventory by standardizing the appearance, organization, and competencies of all ICDC units, leading to progressive certification. ICDC officer and NCO professional development courses, possibly taught by New Iraqi Army cadre, should be established at centralized locations (such as at the Kirkush Military Training Base) so as to facilitate force standardization. Current ICDC training and standardization plans should be completed by 1 April 2004; it is strongly recommended that programming flexibility be maintained to continue force growth beyond current plans should the situation dictate further ICDC expansion.
- **New Iraqi Army** We do not believe the current situation warrants assigning the Army internal security tasks. The ongoing NIA program to create a values-based officer & NCO corps and a quality national institution committed to the defense of Iraqi sovereignty should be continued. However, in light of the nature of the current threat (internal vs. external), a reduction in the rate of New Iraqi Army training and fielding – currently plans providing for 3 divisions, (9 brigades, 27 battalions), by the November 2004 – should be considered. The planned rapid buildup puts at risks quality control; more important it is extremely resource intensive. An alternate plan calling for the continuation of all programmed officer and NCO training to serve as the cadre for the 3 division force, but the fielding of only 3 brigades (9 battalions) by November would result in a savings of some \$600 million this year, (though costs would be only deferred to future years, not eliminated). Additionally some 350 Coalition Support Team trainers due to deploy to Iraq in coming months to mentor Army units could be reallocated to internal security force (Police, Border Police and ICDC) training and certification programs [Annex G]. Those New Iraqi Army officer and NCO cadres trained but not assigned to units could be assigned to Iraqi military training sites, establish and run professional development programs for ICDC cadre, serve in Coalition units to gain field experience, and attend in greater than currently planned numbers training courses in the US and UK – all of this setting the conditions for a more rapid growth of New Iraqi Army forces in 2005.

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There are significant downsides to this course of action. Reorganizing an ongoing program of this magnitude in a wartime theater is an extraordinarily difficult task. Moreover, the New Iraqi Army serves as a potent symbol of national sovereignty and unity to a people attempting to establish political cohesion; it is also a hedge against any drift towards civil war. Accordingly, potential trades must be carefully considered. Nevertheless, the Team believes that the strategic concept of moving from local to national hand-off becomes more feasible in the near-term by shifting resources to the local and regional/provincial security building efforts.

- **Critical Infrastructure Protection** Critical Infrastructure Protection (oil, electricity, transportation, and perhaps water) is crucial to campaign success. The Coalition Commander must have the necessary authority to shape and maintain close operational linkages with Iraqi Security Forces assigned to infrastructure protection missions. The Oil Ministry has established, via a UK contractor, what appears to be an effective Iraqi infrastructure force linked to the Coalition forces in sector. Similar forces need to be established for other important Iraqi infrastructure ministries (electricity, transportation, etc.); however, these others lack the monies and self-interest of the Oil Ministry. Hence, these organizations require a guaranteed multi-year flow of funds to ensure adequate plans are developed and implemented under the oversight of the Coalition Command. In the absence of effective Iraqi Ministries of the Interior and Defense, current transaction costs are deemed too high to recommend consolidation of Critical Infrastructure Protection responsibilities under one ministry. Additionally, complex operational concepts (eg, distributing responsibilities across various Iraqi Security Forces) are unlikely to prove feasible at this stage in the campaign. Accordingly, the Oil Ministry model is recommended.

In line with CPA plans, the Coalition Command is divesting itself of the responsibility for paying Facilities Protection Services (FPS) salaries, and transferring this duty to relevant ministries. Efforts to achieve this objective have been only partially successful. CPA must continue to push Iraqi authorities to assume control of all FPS employees; pragmatically, however, the Coalition Command must attempt to find alternative employment in Iraqi Security Forces for those FPS members refused hire by ministries, and funds must be available to maintain their salaries until this problem – a potential source of local crime and violence – is solved.

Certification Process and Measuring Success Consistent with the strategic concept of transitioning from local to national hand-off, the Coalition Command and MSCs need to establish a robust certification program for Iraqi Security Forces at local and regional/provincial levels. The focus should be on Iraqi Security Force capabilities and credibility, not raw numbers of trainees and equipment. For example, what counts at the local level is the effectiveness of police units (stations, patrol forces, etc.), not the fact that a certain number of variously trained but un-mentored policemen are available for duty. To cite several good practices observed in the field - 18th Military Police Brigade in

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Baghdad has developed a useful police station checklist that approaches a certification methodology, while the Multinational Division Southeast has drafted a certification plan for various Iraqi Security Forces in sector. The Coalition Command should provide MSCs with broad certification parameters, and then permit the MSCs to refine them in accordance with local realities and requirements. The goal must be to certify all ICDC companies and urban police stations by 1 July 2004, and to complete ICDC battalion and higher-level police certification by 1 September 2004. The key to the success of this program is the one-on-one mentoring by Coalition soldiers and, whenever available, civilian experts. It is assumed that not all Iraqi units will pass muster by the target dates. The aim is to reduce significantly the requirement for other Coalition forces in the next major force rotation. Measurements of success must focus on the performance of Iraqi units independent of Coalition forces - less coordination and special types of assistance (eg, intelligence fusion, etc.). Key will be the approval of the people within the areas Iraqi Security Forces operate. The Team noted with interest the deployment of a UK operational analysis (OA) team to Basra to support Multinational Division Southeast efforts to develop measures of effectiveness by which to certify Iraqi Security Forces.

Key - let's discuss! from all OKSA Bulletin

Militias The final disposition of Kurdish and Shi'a party militias has not been resolved. Two Kurdish ICDC battalions have been established in Northern Iraq, and the 36th ICDC Battalion is comprised of various former-party militiamen. Programmatically it is possible to integrate significant numbers of party militia forces into an expanded ICDC, although quality control and ongoing efforts to establish ICDC as a recognized national force would suffer. Integration into the ICDC, coupled with a disarmament and demobilization program, might help resolve the militia problem. However, the issue remains a political one. Consideration must be given to possible Sunni backlash and the risk of sanctioning forces that might hinder efforts to achieve national unity.

Resourcing Security The security situation in Iraq requires security forces to be expanded beyond the strengths planned in the FY2004 Iraqi budget, the FY2004 Coalition Provisional Authority budget, the FY2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, and the Act's section 2207 report to Congress. To support transition to Iraqi sovereignty and the hand-off of security responsibilities from Coalition to Iraqi forces, adequate indigenous security forces must be manned, equipped, and trained now. The acquisition process is not meeting the equipment demand. To meet transition timelines, many recommendations in this report can be implemented over a period of months, but the procurement of critical security force equipment, including weapons, vehicles, and communications equipment, cannot wait. All parties recognize that security is the top priority; it follows that funding sources to satisfy urgent needs should not be restricted to that previously budgeted for the security sector. Urgently required equipment and facilities should be offset from the most readily available sources. The following summarizes individual security force needs:

- **Iraqi Armed Forces** The FY2004 CPA budget funded 27 battalions on an ambitious timeline to be in the field by November 2004. Since Iraqi Army units are neither designed nor intended for use against insurgents, fielding of these

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battalions can be delayed and resources re-targeted to other forces that currently have greater utility. Reducing the number of battalions fielded this year to 9, and limiting facilities to three bases, a naval facility, and several recruiting stations, would provide at least \$600 million and some 350 Coalition trainers for use elsewhere. Funds diverted for other uses now will require repayment before the end of FY2006, or will need to be alternatively sourced, if original force strength objectives are to be achieved.

- **Iraqi Civil Defense Corps** Plans are underway to expand ICDC strength from the 36 battalions included in current FY2004 budgets to 43 battalions. Further, the ICDC was not part of the original security structure, but was created by MSCs in response to conditions on the ground and its requirements were late to be defined. Current budgets underestimate requirements. Although the MSCs partially equipped ICDC units using CERP funds, delays in executing supplemental funds have left a significant shortage of weapons, vehicles, communications equipment and body armor. The unbudgeted equipment shortfall is approximately \$30M.
- **Police** Iraqi policemen have been fielded at less than planned rates, and those that are on patrol are only partially equipped and are of questionable effectiveness. FY2004 budgets planned on an eventual police force strength of 72,000. The new target is 85,000. The main shortfalls are vehicles, weapons, and communications equipment. Facilities are also needed. The principal reason for the delay in fielding policemen has been the difficulty in executing the civilian police-training (Civ-Pol) program. This program counted on 1500 foreign law enforcement officers to train Iraqi police, at a budgeted cost of approximately \$540 million but is likewise behind schedule. To date approximately 50 trainers have deployed to Iraq. Approximately \$150 million budgeted for the Civ-Pol program this year cannot now be spent. These funds should be retargeted to urgently needed police equipment and facilities. In the absence of Civ-Pol trainers, U.S. Army military police are training Iraqi police. The manpower demands of this mission are significant, and promise to become more challenging when the planned force rotation draws down the numbers of military police this spring. *where are they?*
- **Border Enforcement and Customs Service** The Border Police and Customs Service are suffering from equipment shortfalls because of acquisition delays. The cost estimates of facilities for the border police and customs service are also suspect as these estimates were constructed without site surveys. These requirements will likely increase once field surveys are done. The amount of this growth cannot be estimated at this time.
- **Critical Infrastructure** Security forces for water, electricity, and oil facilities are provided for by the respective Ministries. The Ministry of Oil has contracted with Erinyss Corporation for security. Ministries with responsibility for other critical infrastructure, (i.e., electricity, transport, etc.), have not made similar

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arrangements. The Ministry of Electricity has budgeted \$50M for security but efforts to restart the 50-year old Iraqi Electricity Protection Service have not yet progressed beyond early contracting preparations.

- **Facilities Protection Services** As noted earlier in the report, resources must be available to cover the salaries of FPS elements not yet absorbed by their parent ministries. ✓
- **Summary** In aggregate, if a decision were made to delay the rate at which the New Iraqi Army is fielded, the amount of funds potentially available this year would offset currently estimated shortfalls for the other security forces. Shortfalls for the Iraqi Police are reduced by unexecuted operations funding for Civ-Pol. Budget estimates continue to be developed.

Business Practices The root cause of difficulty in equipping and facilitating Iraqi security forces is an acquisition process not designed or mobilized for wartime exigencies. To meet transition timelines, security force equipment contracts must be let now; however, the acquisition process cannot be made responsive. Further, shortages of trained personnel in the CPA Project Management Office (PMO) and the Iraqi ministries preclude quickly providing the required documents and information. Accordingly the Team makes the following recommendations:

- The current practice of soliciting volunteers for service in Iraq has proved inadequate. Backfilling urgent needs with military officers has been in progress since December via Joint Staff sourcing. These officers are beginning to arrive in Baghdad to serve in PMO, but this action alone is not meeting needs. To remedy shortages affecting acquisition, a team of experts should be designated for assignment to CPA in Baghdad to translate known Ministry requirements, for critically needed security force equipment and facilities, into contracts. The team should report directly to the CPA Chief Operating Officer and serve until contracts with satisfactory delivery dates are in place. Department of Defense members should be designated under the crisis provisions of DoDD 1404.10 for Emergency-Essential Employees. Members from other agencies should be similarly designated.
- Acquisition processes in the Department of Defense are specified in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). Section 50 of the FAR empowers the President to authorize contracts without regard to other provisions of law when it facilitates the national defense. Immediately equipping Iraqi Security Forces is a matter of national security. The Secretary of Defense should request that the President authorize Section 50 authority for critical Iraqi security force needs. This recommendation is currently in legal review.

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CONCLUSION

Based on the evidence gathered during its assessment, the Team concluded that considerable security challenges will remain in Iraq in the near- to mid-term; the security situation is not yet stable. The USCENTCOM campaign plan to sequentially transition security responsibilities to properly trained, equipped, and certified Iraqi Security Forces is sound. However, in the absence of unity of command, the plan is at risk.

Annexes:

- A. Iraq Security Force Assessment Team Members
- B. Terms of Reference
- C. List of Interviewees
- D. Current Iraq Security Force C2, Responsibilities, and Authorities Matrix
- E. MND(SE) Concept for Hand-off
- F. Recommended C2 Structure
- G. Potential New Iraqi Army Resource Trade-Offs.

Approved for Release

EYES ONLY
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Kellogg

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MEMO TO: AMB Jerry Bremer

DATE: February 11, 2004

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Iraqi Security Forces

Jerry,

We wanted to get your thoughts on the attached memo before the Secretary sends this out. There is much here that will be contentious and it is important that we have a full understanding of your concerns and any objections.

You'll note that the memo does not address the Facilities Protection Service or the broader issue of securing Iraq's infrastructure. We would welcome your thoughts on what should be done on those fronts.

Paul W.

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EYES ONLY

Pages 20 through 23 redacted for the following reasons:

DRAFT

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